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 Executive summary 
 
Existing empirical studies on trade costs and trade facilitation largely focus on aggregate 
impacts of reform due to data availability. We take a step toward filling in this gap in literature. 
Using the World Bank Enterprises Surveys, the study extends the scope of empirical literature to 
firm dimension with a focus on SMEs. For Asia countries, we find that improvement in trade 
facilitation indicators tend to increase the probability that SMEs will become exporter -- as well 
as their export propensity. In particular, increasing policy predictability and enhancing 
information technology services are the most effective measures for SMEs in expanding trade.  
We also find that SMEs are less responsive to improvement in transportation infrastructure, 
overall, than large enterprises while increasing policy predictability matters more to SMEs. In 
summary, in order to expand the benefits of trade to SMEs, countries need to make more 
substantial investments in reform – in particular in the “soft” part of trade facilitation.  
 
  iIntroduction 
 
Two conflicting dynamics in today’s international trading system suggest that trade 
facilitation is particularly important to development prospects. On the one hand, tariffs have been 
significantly cut through a combination of multilateral, regional, and unilateral efforts. It is 
important to recognize, however, the increasingly important role of other factors in driving a 
wedge between export and import prices—and the role of trade facilitation policies in reducing 
that wedge.  The second dynamic relates to the institutional nature of the trade reform process. 
Ensuring a successful conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda is an important aim for all 
WTO members.  
 
Progress at the multilateral level, however, is increasingly difficult for a number of 
reasons including the lack of willingness among some members to engage in substantive reform. 
Nevertheless, recovery from the current crisis requires addressing trade barriers now. Countries 
eager to move forward on trade reform seek new agendas at the domestic and regional levels. 
Trade facilitation represents an increasingly important part of trade reform.   
 
Trade facilitation is a multi-faceted area. Unlike cutting tariffs or eliminating quotas, 
progress on trade facilitation can involve resource costs related to improving trade-related 
infrastructure, or streamlining customs administrations. Before investing in these measures, it is 
important for policymakers to understand the behavior of exporters and to have an idea of what 
affect their companies and where the priorities are in reform for their countries.  
 
Firms make conscious decision about entering export markets before they decide how 
many goods or services they want to send abroad. Due to higher costs and risks, only a minority 
of firms in each country actually exports
1. Those which do export tend to be larger and more 
productive.  One powerful explanation is the existence of cross-border trade costs. Only the most 
productive firms are able to make profit withstanding the additional costs associated with 
exporting. Less productive ones cannot do so and only produce for the domestic market
2. Scale 
economy and increased competition due to direct contact with global markets tend to further 
increase the profitability and productivity of exporters.  
 
This has a number of important implications on the role of trade costs and trade 
facilitation. First, as trade costs fall, low-productivity firms at the edge of becoming exporters 
will start to find it profitable to export. Trade facilitation can, therefore, promote the entry of 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) into export markets. It will expand the number of 
firms in direct contact with the world market and extend the benefits of trade. Second, lower 
trade costs tend to increase firms’ propensity to export and stimulate the growth of exporters. 
The overall effect will be the reallocation of resources from low-productivity to high-
productivity firms and higher productivity of the economy. 
 
Existing empirical studies on trade costs and trade facilitation largely focus on aggregate 
impacts of reform due to data availability. We take a step toward filling in this gap in literature. 
Using the World Bank Enterprises Surveys, the study extends the scope of empirical literature to 
                                                 
1 See Bernard et al. (2007) for a survey of the literature. 
2 See Melitz (2003) for a theoretical model. 
  1firm dimension with a focus on SMEs. For Asia countries, we find that improvement in trade 
facilitation indicators tend to increase the probability that firms will become exporter as well as 
their export propensity. In particular, increasing policy predictability and enhancing IT services 
are the most effective. SMEs appear to be less responsive to improvement in transportation 
infrastructure than large enterprises. On the other hand, increasing policy predictability affects 
SMEs more.  In order to expand the benefits of trade to SMEs, countries need to make more 
substantial investment as well as to pay attention to the “soft” part of trade facilitation.  
 
SMEs and Exporter Premier 
 
The World Bank Enterprises Surveys provide very valuable information to investigate 
firms’ exports and trade facilitation despite the data’s limitations
3. First, we can distinguish 
SMEs as well as exporters using the World Bank Enterprises Surveys. The surveys conducted in 
ten East and Southeast Asian countries and four South Asian countries from 2002-2006 are used 
4(Table 1). It includes 14862 firms operating in fourteen manufacturing sectors
5 (Table 2). 
Among them, sixty percent are SMEs that are defined as firms with a employment less than 100. 
Firms are also required to disclose their status as exporters and the share of exports to their total 
sales.  Thirty-six percent of firms were exporters when surveyed (Tables 1 and 2).  
 
Exporters tend to be larger and more productive than non-exporters.  There exists a 
premium of being an exporter. Using the Enterprise Surveys from 2002-2006 of all countries, we 
confirmed this regularity, consistent with various studies
67.  Exporters are much larger in size 
valuated by sales (Figure 1). The magnitude of the premium is greater for SMEs. For all regions, 
the sales of exporters are 64 percent larger than those of non-exporters among large firms, and 
double the sales of non-exporters among SMEs. The exporter premium for SMEs is the largest in 
Asia countries, about 120 percent.  Exporters are not that different when they are large firms in 
South Asia as sales of exporters are only 22 percent larger than those of non-exporters.  
Evaluated by sales per labor, labor productivity is higher in exporting companies than in non-
exporting ones
8. An employee of exporters generates 20 percent more sales than an employee of 
non-exporters if both companies are large. The difference is more significant if the companies 
are SMEs, almost 50 percent higher. Comparing across regions, the exporter premier on labor 
                                                 
3 Some limitations include small number of firms for some countries, and non-panel structure of data. 
4 These countries are Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Korea, the Republic, 
Thailand, and Vietnam of East and Southeast Asia, and Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from South Asia. 
5 These sectors are textiles, leather, garments, food, beverages, metal and machinery, electronics, chemical and 
pharmaceutics, wood and furniture, non-metallic and plastic materials, paper, auto and transportation equipments, 
construction, and other manufacturing. 
6 See for instance, Bernard and Jensen (1995), Bernard and Jensen (2007), Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) and the 
World Bank (2007). 
7 Following previous studies, we obtain export premier by estimating a simple model.  The L.H.S. is firm 
characteristics, including sales and sales per labor. The R.H.S includes a dummy on exporter while controlling for 
country fixed effects, sector fixed effects and year fixed effects. In order to distinguish between SMEs and large 
firms, we add a dummy on SME and interact the dummy with the dummy on exporter. The coefficient on the 
dummy on exporter will imply the exporter premier among larger firms and the coefficient on the interact term will 
indicate the exporter premier among SMEs. 
8 Due to limited observation on other variables, we cannot compute other measures of productivity for majority of 
Asian firms. 
  2productivity for SMEs is the highest for countries in Asia, 58 percent for South Asia and 75 
percent for East and Southeast Asia. 
 
Trade Facilitation Measures and SMEs’ Perception 
 
We also construct country-sector-year specific indicators on trade facilitation, taking 
advantage of the questionnaires. The surveys ask individual firms to assess the business 
operating environment. We first select a set of assessments capturing a broader range of trade 
facilitation measures. As a second step, we take the average of these assessments over country, 
sector, and year. This has two advantages: first, it helps to alleviate the potential endogeneity 
problem associated with firm level perception; second, it will extend the coverage to firms which 
operate in the same country and the same sector at the same year but fail to answer the question. 
This is especially helpful to include more non-exporters.  
In its narrow sense, trade facilitation refers to improving the logistics of moving goods through 
ports and increasing custom efficiency for cross-border trade. Time is essential to business. 
Additional delay in shipping could reduce trade by 1 percent
9. In the Enterprise Surveys, firms 
are asked to evaluate to what extent that customs and trade regulations are obstacles to business. 
The scale ranges from 0, no obstacle, to 4, severe obstacle.  Exporters or importers also report 
the average days to clear their goods from the port of exit or the port of entry. We use all three 
answers as measures on customs efficiency.  
 
A broad view of trade facilitation has emerged in the international development 
community. At its most general, it includes all measures to improve the environment in which 
trade takes place and reduce the costs of importing and exporting. Transparency of policy and 
regulations, good governance, convergence of standards, upgrading of IT services and 
improvement in other infrastructures have all shown to matter.  
 
Transparency of policy has two dimensions, predictability and simplification. First, 
transparency through greater certainty can lower trade costs for business. A country with low 
level of corruption, good governance and effective legal system can offer more certainty in the 
interpretation and implementation of its trade policy. Transparency through fewer “layers” of 
trade regulation and better institutions will cut information and compliance costs for business. 
Helble, Shepherd, and Wilson (2007) construct export and import transparency indices capturing 
the idea. Based on these indices, improving importer transparency of APEC economies to the 
regional average can lead to 7.5% ($148bn) increase in intra-regional trade as well as expand 
global welfare by $406bn
10.  In the Enterprise Surveys, firms also provide their view on 
corruption, and economic and regulatory policy uncertainty as an obstacle to business (0-4 scale). 
They also express their confidence in legal system regarding enforcing contractual and property 
rights. The scale is from 1, fully disagree with effective protection, to 6, fully agree. We use 
answers to these three questions to capture the essence of transparency of policy and good 
governance.  
 
Transportation infrastructure and IT services have gained increasing importance in trade 
facilitation. Poor roads and congested ports limit trade. Improved roads in Eastern Europe and 
                                                 
9 See Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2006). 
10 See Helble, Shepherd, and Wilson (2007), and Abe and Wilson (2008). 
  3Central Asia could expand trade by 50%
11. 10% increase in the capacity of East Asia ports 
lowers costs by 9%
12.  High quality IT services and competitive IT sectors generate spillovers to 
all aspects of economic activities, including trade. Considering together with port efficiency, 
customs environment, and regulatory environment, IT infrastructure improves trade. For 
Southeast Asia, trade flows are sensitive to IT technology and transport infrastructure. Improving 
competitiveness in internet services would boost trade by 5.7% ($1.7bn)
13. We use firms’ 
assessment on transportation infrastructure and telecommunication as obstacles to business as the 
first set of measures on infrastructure. The Surveys also ask firms to provide evaluation on the 
affordability (0, not affordable – 1, affordable) and quality of IT services (1, very poor-4, very 
good). We take the average of the answer to each question over country, sector and year and then 
multiply the two numbers together to get our measure on IT services. As it incorporates richer 
information than the answers to business obstacles, we use it as our benchmark measure in 
impact analysis. 
 
Before proceeding to impact analysis, we first have a look at SMEs’ perception on the 
various aspects of trade facilitations. We use answers to business obstacles to make the 
comparison (Figure 3). Clearly, the inefficiency in customs and trade regulations, the lack of 
transparency, and the inadequate infrastructure have been constraints to business operation in all 
Asian countries. Even looking at the best case, there are still 34 percent of SMEs and 45 percent 
large firms saying that IT services were obstacles. Interestingly, the proportion of SMEs 
complaining about all measures was smaller than that of large companies. SMEs are more 
dynamic and often the source of innovations. In short, they tend to look inward to adapt to the 
markets when facing obstacles. That might be a reason why we observe less complains from 
them. Another reason might be that countries have been successful in facilitating the 
development of SMEs.  
 
Turning to assessment on each policy measure, the proportion of companies regarding 
transparency of policy as constraints was the largest. For East and Southeast Asian companies, 
economic policy and regulatory policy uncertainty was the number one obstacle as 63 percent of 
SMEs and 73 percent of large companies said it constrain their business operation. For South 
Asian companies, corruption ranked the worst which was followed by policy uncertainty.  There 
were also large portion of companies complaining about inefficient customs and trade 
regulations. The case of South Asia was more severe, half of SMEs and 70 percent of large 
enterprises rated it as an obstacle. Infrastructures, especially IT services, have seen rapid 
development in most Asian countries and some have opened IT sector to foreign competition. 
The progress seemed to be well perceived by enterprises—the smallest portions of companies 
complained about infrastructure as constraints. The fact should be kept in mind is that there is 
still space for improvement when comparing with industrialized countries.  
 
SMEs’ evaluation also varies across countries and over time (Figures 5-9). We are aware 
of the fact that the numbers of observations of surveys are quite different and the simple 
summary figures should be interpreted with caution. In general, SMEs in countries with higher 
income complained less. Korea, the Republic, had the smallest fraction of firms saying customs, 
                                                 
11 Shepherd and Wilson (2007). 
12 Abe and Wilson (2009). 
13 Mann, Otsuki, and Wilson (2005), and Shepherd and Wilson (2009). 
  4transportation and IT services were somewhat obstacles to business operation. Thailand and 
Malaysia also tended to have better perceived trade facilitation measures among SMEs. The 
perception seemed to improve over time, too. Unfortunately, we only include one survey for 
countries, except India
14. Looking at the two surveys on India, one in 2002 and the other in 2006, 
there was a clear fall in the faction of SMEs which saw trade facilitation measures as business 
constraints. For customs and trade regulations, the faction changed from 57 percent in 2002 to 39 
percent in 2006. 
 
Trade Facilitation and Firms’ Exports 
 
Now, we turn to investigate the impact of trade facilitation measures on firms’ export 
performance. Following recent theories, the impact can be two folds: first and foremost, trade 
facilitation should increase the number of firms decide to start exporting by reducing trade costs; 
second, trade facilitation may stimulate growth of exports by affecting how much exporters sell 
abroad relative to sell domestically as the costs of trade falls. For an individual firm, we interpret 
the two aspects as the probability of exporting impact and the export propensity impact. It can be 
illustrated with a simple model.  
 
Assume a representative firm with fixed cost for producing  and a variable cost 
. Both are affected by firm specific characteristics, such as size, managerial ability, 
labor productivity, and ownership structure, denoted by . Suppose exporting imposes 
additional fixed costs to the firm. For instance, completing the documents needed for custom 
clearance requires at least a one- time investment in learning the documents and maybe an initial 
cost of contacting external brokers for that purpose. The fixe cost is denoted by 
. The first component of the fixed cost is the fixed cost of exports common 
to industry s located in country c at time t. The costs may due to compliance with customs and 
other trade regulations, non-transparent policy, and insufficient infrastructure. The second 
component represents the firm-wise deviation from the common costs due to the varied impact 
perceived by each firm, which is potentially affected by firm specific characteristics,  . 
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Subsequently, selling the product abroad also requires additional variable cost. For 
instance, when exporting perishables longer delays means more losses for each unit exported. As 
an automotive-component exporter from a small country, the firm suffers if its relationship with 
foreign customers is interrupted by a sudden change in exchange rates. They do not have many 
alternative buyers domestically and therefore, have to leverage against the uncertainty of 
domestic policy for each unit of exports. The variable cost is denoted as  .   
is the amount exported.  , firm specific characteristics are also included since they may be 
correlated with its variable export costs.   represents the costs must be withstood by a firm of 
industry s located in country c at time t to export each unit of products.  These costs may include 
the time costs due to custom clearance, poor transportation conditions, and IT services, as well as 
costs incurred to leverage against additional risks due to policy uncertainty.  
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14 Survey on China conducted in 2003 is dropped in this exercise due to limited observations for some questions. 
  5Assuming exogenously determined prices in foreign markets, firm i receives from exports  
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It will export if and only if the expected profits from exporting are positive. Define the export 
status of firm i is given by   then:   i Y
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It implies that the probability of exporting is a function of firm characteristics, and additional 
fixed and variable trade costs which is industry-country-time specific: 
 




i i F c W f Y prob = = .  (2) 
Once firm decides to export, its total profits will be the sum of the profits from domestic sales 
and those from exports .  In 
equilibrium, the share of exports in total sales is a function of firm characteristics, and additional 
fixed and variable trade costs which is industry-country-time specific. Define the share as export 
propensity, EP
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Following the ideas of equation (2) and (3), we estimate the impacts using reduced form 
specifications. In particular, we assume that the unobservable firm idiosyncratic characteristics 
are normally distributed. For the probability of exporting, we then follow a probit model: 
 
1 = i Y  if   0 * ≥ + + + + + ∗ i t s c cst i v D D D TF X a γ  and  . (4)  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ N vi
0 = i Y  other wise  
For the export propensity, we follow a tobit model taking into account the issue that the share is 
bounded by zero and one. Define the latent export propensity as 
 
i t c s cst i i u D D D TF X EP + + + + + ∗ = * * θ β  and    then   ) 1 , 0 ( ~ N ui
0 = i EP  if     0 *≤ i EP
* i i EP EP =  if   . (5)  1 * 0 ≤ < i EP
  61 = i EP  if   .  * 1 i EP <
TFcst represents measures on trade facilitation indicators as explained above. They 
include measures on the efficiency of customs, the transparency of policy, transportation 
infrastructure and IT services. All are country-sector-year specific average values. Xi represents 
firm specific characteristics, including employment size, labor productivity valued by sales per 
labor, a dummy on management with college education and foreign share in ownership. Dc , Ds  
and Dt  denote a set of country fixed effects, sector fixed effects and year fixed effects. In 
particular, tariff and non-tariff barriers, and other country and industry specific factors are, hence, 
taken into account. 
 
The results strongly support the idea that all trade facilitation reforms will increase the 
probability of exporting by firms as well as export propensity (Table 3, Table 4). In particular, 
improvement in trade transparency and IT services are indicated to be the most effective. Start 
with the impact on the probability of exporting. First, we look at the relationship when including 
one measure at a time. Recall that we use the days to clear exports, the days to clear imports, and 
firms’ perception of customs and trade regulation as business operation obstacles to examine the 
impact of custom efficiency. For all three indicators, we expect the estimated coefficients to be 
negative if custom efficiency facilitates entry. The results are consistent with the expectation 
(Columns 3 -5 of Table 3). Firms tend to start exports when there are reductions in days to clear 
exports or imports. The same is true when there is perceived improvement in customs and trade 
regulations—less of an obstacle.  
 
Three indicators are used to measure transparency of policy: firms’ perception on 
corruption as operation obstacles, their perception on uncertainty of economic and regulatory 
policies as obstacles, and their confidence in legal system. If transparency matters, we would 
expect the coefficients on the former two variables as negative and the coefficient on the last as 
positive. Again, the results offer support to the hypothesis (Columns 6 -8 of Table 3). Less 
corruption and more predictability certainly encourage firms to enter export markets. The impact 
of legal protection is not significant. Finally, we use firms’ perception on transportation as 
obstacles and their assessment of the affordability and quality of IT services to evaluate 
infrastructure. The former term should have negative impact and the latter should have positive 
impact. The coefficient on IT services is consistent with the hypothesis, indicating IT services 
stimulate entry into foreign markets while the coefficient on transportation does not matter in this 
case (Columns 9 -10 of Table 3). 
 
In practice, all trade facilitation policies interact with each other. Customs regulation 
reforms will only stay on the paper if the officials are highly corrupted. Overall predictability of 
trade policy will enhance the impact of customs modernization by reducing additional risks. 
Improvement in transportation infrastructure tends to affect exports more when trade regulations 
and good governance make exporting possible for more firms. IT services, on the other hand, 
helps to improve efficiency overall and reduce costs. In order to take into account those 
correlations, we consider all aspects of trade facilitations together. The results confirm the idea 
that the various measures interact with each other and that reducing policy uncertainty and 
enhancing IT services are relatively more effective measures in reform than others examined 
here (Columns 1-2 of Table 3).   
  7Improving the efficiency of customs clearly matters. Reducing days to exports by half 
will increase the probability of exporting by 7.5 to 12 percent. The role played by policy 
transparency becomes clearer and stronger. When considering with days to exports together, 
firms’ perception on corruption as obstacles seems to matter less while firms’ perception on 
policy uncertainty show greater impact, and firms’ evaluation on legal protection has significant 
impact, too. Combining with results from using individual measures, it may imply the following. 
First, the results on days of exports have incorporated the impact of corruption and therefore, 
reducing corruption is effective in increasing customs efficiency. Second, policy uncertainty 
adds additional risks on top of customs efficiency and dominates customs and trade regulations 
in affecting firms’ entry decision. Finally, legal environment plays a role but it is builds upon the 
effectiveness of other trade facilitation policies. Better data and more sophisticated method are 
needed to confirm these implications. 
 
Interestingly, the impact of transportation infrastructure is shown to be significant and the 
impact of IT services more than doubles. Analogous to the idea of policy transparency, it may 
have the following indications. The improvement in transportation infrastructure matters but is 
highly correlated with other policy measures. Progresses in IT services tend to encourage entry 
alone as well as through other trade facilitation measures. 
The impact of trade facilitation on export propensity shows a similar pattern (Table 4). Policy 
predictability and IT services are shown to be the most effective while all trade facilitation 
reforms encourage more exports. Custom efficiency matters while the impact is correlated with 
the level of corruption and the level of policy uncertainty.  Reducing days to clear exports by half 
may increase the share of exports in total sales by 1.6 to 4.5 percent. Increasing policy 
predictability leads to substantial increases in exports propensity. Legal environment seems to 
matter when all other factors are controlled for.  Improvement in transportation infrastructure 
would encourage exports while it is highly correlated with the effectiveness of other measures. 
Enhancing IT services is a very effective trade facilitation measure and its impact tends to work 
through other measures, too. 
 
 
Trade Facilitation and Impact on SMEs 
 
We further investigate the impact on SMEs’ probability of exporting and export 
propensity. In order to do so, we create a dummy on SMEs and interact it with all measures on 
trade facilitation. The coefficient on each trade facilitation measure imply the impact on large 
firms, and the sum of the coefficient on each measure and the coefficient on the interacted term 
shows the impact on SMEs. The dummy on SMEs is omitted as we have employment size as 
covariate. In other words, we measure the impact of trade facilitation among SMEs and the 
impact among large firms separately. An implicit assumption is that firm individual 
characteristics and other aggregated fixed effects will have same impact for the two groups. 
The estimated impacts on SMEs of all trade facilitation measures are in line with the results 
when considering firms of all sizes. However, SMEs’ exporting behavior seems to be 
significantly less responsive to improvement in transportation infrastructure but much more 
responsive to policy predictability. In other words, this measure is probably the most effective in 
encouraging the entry of SMEs as well as increasing their export propensity.  
  8We investigate the impact of each trade facilitation measure by itself as well as together 
with other factors. The pattern across measures when only considering SMEs is the same as that 
for all firms (Tables 5 and 6). Focusing on the results from using all trade facilitation measures, 
the impact on SMEs tends to be smaller than that on firms of all sizes for transportation 
infrastructure and IT services (Figures 10 and 11). Policy uncertainty, however, affects SMEs 
more. For comparison purpose, we convert the estimated coefficients of Column 2 of Table 5 
and Comlun 2 of Table 6 into positive measures. In other words, we consider how improvement 
in each measure will affect the probability of exporting and export propensity even. The negative 
coefficient on firms’ perception on customs as obstacles, for instance, is converted into positive 
coefficient of the same magnitude.  
 
Firms’ perception on transportation increase by 1 unit only leads to 29 percent increase in 
the probability of exporting among SMEs while the same change can increase the probability by 
60 percent among firms of all sizes (Figure 10). The difference of impacts on exports propensity 
is also significantly large. The same improvement can only increase SMEs’ export propensity by 
1.8 percent while it can lead to 34 percent increase in the export propensity when considering all 
firms (Figure 11). The case of IT services is similar though the differences are much smaller. 
Interestingly, reducing policy uncertainty tends to affect SMEs more than it does to firms of all 
sizes. When firms’ assessment on policy uncertainty improves by 1 unit, the probability of 
exporting for SMEs increases by 66 percent while the probability for all firms increases by 62 
percent (Figure 10). The same change leads to 53 increases in SME’s export propensity, in 
comparison of 42 percent in all firms’ export propensity. Legal environment is a factor which 
tends to affect SMEs and large firms in the same magnitude (Figure 11).  
 
In summary, for Asia countries, we find that improvement in trade facilitation indicators 
tend to increase the probability that SMEs will become exporter as well as their export 
propensity. In particular, increasing policy predictability and enhancing IT services are the most 
effective. SMEs appear to be less responsive to improvement in transportation infrastructure than 
large enterprises. On the other hand, increasing policy predictability affects SMEs more.  In 
order to expand the benefits of trade to SMEs, countries need to make more substantial 
investment as well as to pay attention to the “soft” part of trade facilitation.  
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Figure 4: Firms Perception on Obstacles to Business South Asia, by Firm Sizes 
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  18Figure 10: Impact on Probability of Exporting 
 
Source: Author calculation. 
DE: Days to clear exports, UN: Uncertainty of Economic and Regulatory Policies, LG: Legal Protection, TR: 
Transportation as obstacles, IT: Affordability and quality of IT services. 
 
Figure 11: Impact on Probability of Exporting 
 
Source: Author calculation. 
DE: Days to clear exports, UN: Uncertainty of Economic and Regulatory Policies, LG: Legal Protection, TR: 
Transportation as obstacles, IT: Affordability and quality of IT services.
  19Table 1: Distribution of SME and Exporters, by Country 
      All  SMEs  Large Firms 
























Cambodia  2003  63  58 92% 4 6% 3 75% 55 93%
China  2002  1020  517 51% 341 33% 105 31% 412 61%
China  2003  1609  266 17% 774 48% 57 7% 207 25%
Indonesia  2003  695  295 42% 334 48% 43 13% 252 70%
Laos  2006  246  87 35% 192 78% 38 20% 49 91%
Malaysia  2002  902  484 54% 600 67% 251 42% 233 77%
Mongolia  2004  193  48 25% 167 87% 27 16% 21 81%
Philippines  2003  716  261 36% 416 58% 78 19% 183 73%
SouthKorea  2005  215  99 46% 156 73% 51 33% 48 81%
Thailand  2004  1385  853 62% 582 42% 225 39% 628 78%
Vietnam  2005  1410  634 45% 681 48% 165 24% 469 64%
Bangladesh  2002  1001  424 42% 336 34% 69 21% 354 54%
India  2002  2218  493 22% 1774 80% 243 16% 114 45%
India  2006  1824  370 20% 1525 84% 315 18% 176 54%
Pakistan  2002  914  168 18% 809 89% 129 16% 39 37%
SriLanka  2004  451  316 70% 195 43% 93 48% 200 88%





  20Table 2: Distribution of SMEs and Exporters, by Industry 

























Textiles  1772 599 34% 1013 57%  209 21% 382 53%
Leather  398 186 47% 275 69%  96 35% 89 75%
Garments  2523 1402 56% 1226 49%  417 34% 975 78%
Food  1932 612 32% 1230 64%  209 17% 396 61%
Beverages  97 21 22% 66 68%  4 6% 17 55%
Metals and machinery  1731 456 26% 1236 71%  211 17% 242 52%
Electronics  2083 736 35% 1120 54%  186 17% 547 59%
Chemicals and pharmaceutics  1210 269 22% 836 69%  121 14% 143 41%
Construction  68 2 3% 66 97%  1 2% 1 50%
Wood and furniture  505 249 49% 317 63%  91 29% 158 84%
Non-metallic and plastic materials  896 396 44% 568 63%  193 34% 199 63%
Paper  151 33 22% 96 64%  13 14% 20 38%
Other manufacturing  224 92 41% 139 62%  52 37% 40 49%
Auto and transportation equipments  1272 320 25% 698 55%  89 13% 231 41%






  21Table 3: Impact of Trade Facilitation Indicators on Probability of Exporting 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Days  to  Clear  Exports  -0.240***  -0.149*  -0.179***         
  (0.082)  (0.085)  (0.052)         
Days  to  Clear  Imports      -0.240***        
      (0.055)        
Customs & Trade Regulation  
as Obstacles       -0.193***       
       (0.065)       
Corruption  as  Obstacles  -0.173       -0.309***      
  (0.125)       (0.065)      
Uncertainty of  Policies as Obstacles    -0.624***          -0.402***       
   (0.123)        (0.064)      
Legal  Protection  0.358**  0.576***        -0.014    
  (0.150)  (0.161)        (0.081)    
Transportation  as  Obstacles -0.952***  -0.600***         -0.132   
  (0.206)  (0.205)         (0.085)   
Quality  of  IT  Services  0.686***  0.839***          0.267*** 
  (0.120)  (0.117)          (0.086) 
No.  of  Obs  5926  5926  13298 13320 11867 11867 11867 11867 11867  7412 
Log-likelihood  -2788 -2775 -6065 -6062 -5567 -5560 -5551 -5572 -5571 -3321 
Chi-Square  1670 1669 3523 3533 3223 3219 3239 3223 3221 2084 
R-squared_pseudo  0.319 0.322 0.306 0.307  0.298  0.299 0.3 0.298  0.298  0.336 
Probit mordel, marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are reported. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All Regressions include firm specific 
characteristics: employment size, sales per labor, a dummy on manager with a college-level education, and foreign share in ownership. All regressions include 




  22Table 4: Impact of Trade Facilitation Indicators on Export Propensity 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Days to Clear Exports  -0.091**  -0.033  -0.049*               
  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.027)         
Days to Clear Imports        -0.126***             
      (0.031)        
Customs & Trade Regulation           -0.107***           
       (0.034)       
Corruption  -0.182***       -0.195***      
  (0.061)       (0.035)      
Uncertainty of Economic & 
 Regulatory Policies    -0.417***       -0.250***     
    (0.057)       (0.035)     
Legal  Protection  0.210***  0.344***        -0.008    
  (0.071)  (0.074)        (0.044)    
Transportation as Obstacles  -0.524***  -0.340***         -0.093**   
  (0.081)  (0.078)         (0.042)   
Quality of IT Services  0.465***  0.539***          0.201*** 
  (0.057)  (0.051)          (0.049) 
No.  of  Obs  5889  5889  13008 13030 11587 11587 11587 11587 11587  7365 
Log-likelihood  3137 3137 8007 8033 6935 6935 6935 6935 6935 4263 
Chi-Square  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-squared_pseudo  2752 2752 4652 4652 4652 4652 4652 4652 4652 3102 
Log-likelihood  -4024 -4001 -7401 -7387 -7401 -7387 -7376 -7407 -7404 -4833 
F  statistics  157 159 265 266 265 266 272 264 266 202 
R-squared_pseudo 0.261  0.265  0.262  0.263 0.262 0.263 0.265 0.261 0.262  0.26 
Tobit model, censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are reported. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All Regressions include firm specific characteristics: 
employment size, sales per labor, a dummy on manager with a college-level education, and foreign share in ownership. All regressions include country fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
 
 
  23Table 5: Impact of Trade Facilitation Indicators on Probability of Exporting, by Firm Sizes 
    1 2  3  4  5 6 7 8  9  10 
Days to Clear Exports  -0.425***  -0.315***  -0.222***               
 (0.102)  (0.106)  (0.055)               
Days to Clear Exports*SME  0.336***  0.264***  0.065***               
 (0.094)  (0.090)  (0.023)               
Days to Clear Imports        -0.279***             
      (0.057)          
Days to Clear Imports*SME        0.065***             
      (0.022)          
Customs & Trade Regulation           -0.237***           
         (0.068)           
Customs & Trade Regulation* SME          0.070**           
         (0.035)           
Corruption -0.03          -0.343***         
  (0.143)        (0.067)        
Corruption*SME -0.223*          0.054*         
  (0.131)        (0.030)        
Uncertainty of Economic & 
 Regulatory Policies   -0.482***         -0.429***      
   (0.139)          (0.066)       
Uncertainty of Economic & 
Regulatory Policies*SME   -0.179         0.041      
   (0.124)          (0.030)       
Legal Protection  0.446***  0.634***            -0.023     
 (0.157)  (0.166)            (0.082)     
Legal Protection*SME  -0.144***  -0.105***            0.019     
 (0.032)  (0.035)            (0.013)     
Transportation as Obstacles  -1.518***  -1.142***             -0.170*  
 (0.240)  (0.243)              (0.088)   
  24Transportation as Obstacles*SME  0.984*** 0.851***              0.067   
 (0.212)  (0.188)              (0.041)   
Quality of IT Services  0.976*** 1.112***                0.265*** 
 (0.133)  (0.132)                (0.087) 
Quality of IT Services*SME  -0.517*** -0.445***                0.005 
 (0.112)  (0.113)                (0.032) 
No. of Obs  5926  5926  13298  13320  11867  11867  11867  11867  11867  7412 
Log-likelihood -2768  -2759  -6061  -6058  -5565 -5558 -5550 -5571  -5569  -3321 
Chi-Square  1639 1641  3466  3469  3185 3180 3212 3194  3187  2085 
R-squared_pseudo 0.324  0.326  0.306  0.307 0.299  0.3  0.3 0.298  0.298  0.336 
Probit mordel, marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are reported. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All Regressions include firm specific 
characteristics: employment size, sales per labor, a dummy on manager with a college-level education, and foreign share in ownership. All regressions include 












  25Table 6: Impact of Trade Facilitation Indicators on Export Propensity, by Firm Sizes 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Days  to  Clear  Exports  -0.101**  -0.027  -0.045         
  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.028)         
Days  to  Clear  Exports*SME  0.084*  0.007  -0.008         
  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.012)         
Days  to  Clear  Imports      -0.126***        
      (0.031)        
Days  to  Clear  Imports*SME      0.001        
      (0.011)        
Customs & Trade Regulation           -0.104***           
       (0.035)       
Customs & Trade Regulation* SME          -0.005           
       (0.019)       
Corruption  -0.053       -0.176***      
  (0.064)       (0.035)      
Corruption*SME  -0.283***       -0.032**      
  (0.064)       (0.016)      
Uncertainty of Economic & 
 Regulatory Policies   -0.292***        -0.249***      
   (0.060)        (0.035)      
Uncertainty of Economic & 
Regulatory Policies*SME    -0.234***       -0.001     
   (0.061)        (0.016)      
Legal  Protection  0.231***  0.344***        -0.01    
  (0.072)  (0.075)          (0.044)    
Legal  Protection*SME  -0.051***  -0.004        0.004    
  (0.015)  (0.018)          (0.006)    
Transportation as Obstacles  -0.737***  -0.553***         -0.088**   
  (0.086)  (0.086)         (0.042)   
  26Transportation as Obstacles*SME  0.663***  0.535***         -0.01   
  (0.100)  (0.091)         (0.022)   
Quality of IT Services  0.550***  0.635***          0.220*** 
  (0.056)  (0.052)          (0.048) 
Quality of IT Services*SME  -0.232***  -0.179***          -0.044*** 
  (0.050)  (0.050)          (0.016) 
No.  of  Obs  5889  5889  13008 13030 11587 11587 11587 11587 11587  7365 
No.  of  Obs  left  censored  3137 3137 8007 8033 6935 6935 6935 6935 6935 4263 
No.  of  Obs  right  censored  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No.  of  Obs  not  censored  2752 2752 5001 4997 4652 4652 4652 4652 4652 3102 
Log-likelihood -3995  -3978  -8123  -8118  -7401 -7385 -7376 -7406 -7404 -4829 
F  statistics  139 140 269 271 257 259 263 256 258 195 
R-squared_pseudo 0.266  0.27  0.263  0.264 0.262 0.264 0.265 0.261 0.262 0.261 
Tobit model, censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are reported. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All Regressions include firm specific characteristics: 
employment size, sales per labor, a dummy on manager with a college-level education, and foreign share in ownership. All regressions include country fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
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